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ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OFSEPTEMBER 11 EVENTS ON FLIGHT TRAINING
Atef Ghobrial and Gregory Streib

I

Abstract

On September 1 1, 2001 the U.S. and the World witnessed the atrocities that terrorists inflicted. These tragic
events have changed the approach for aviation security planning, management and policy. This paper attempted to
address the effects of September 1 1 on the flight training business. We designed a questionnaire and surveyed 12
flight training schools in Metro Atlanta. Analysis of the data was conducted using simple statistical correlations and
cross tabulation. The results of the analysis are discussed in the body of the paper, and limitations of the study are also
addressed.
INTRODUCTION
Aviation security has been on the government's
agenda over the past thirty years in a cycle that overlays
terrorist incidents involving airliners. Although the aviation
community witnessed its first hijacking attempt in 1931, it
was not until the late 1960's that terrorist hijackings and
sabotage of commercial airlines took a sharp increase. The
majority of hijackings and sabotages towards the end of the
past century were aimed at Western governments. Terrorists
repeatedly took advantage of the West's neglect to bring
about major aviation security reform. Commercial aviation
became a favored target of terrorists because airlines
represent a nationally-labeled container of hostages in the
case of hijackings, or victims in the case of sabotage. For
years, an inefficient system of aviation security has given
terrorists an instrumentto force not only political changes to
influence the West's foreign policy, but also national
turmoil and disruptions for whatever nation they prey on.
Inadequate practices and procedures have been
repeatedly documented and reported revealing
vulnerabilities in the U.S. aviation security system well
before the events of September 11, 2001 (GAO, May 25,
2000 & June 28,2000). The commercial aviation industry
lacked a uniform system of security procedures. Airlines
have operated in an extremely volatile, cost sensitive
environment, especiallyfollowingderegulation in 1978.The
responsibility of providing security screeners had been
placed in the hands of air caniers until the recent changes to
federalize screeners.
On September 11,2001 the United States and the
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world witnessed the atrocities that terrorists inflicted.
Commercial airlinerswere hijacked and utilized as weapons
when the two World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon
were attacked causing deaths and destructions that will
always be remembered. The Federal Aviation
Administration's immediate response was to shut down the
nation's airway system including airports. Not only were
commercial air carriersgrounded, but general aviation flying
was also stopped. The FAA's crackdown on the nation's
small aircraft industry lasted for nearly two weeks. With the
banning of all Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flights during
these two weeks, flight training schoolsacross the U.S. were
unable to operate their businesses. It is estimated that the
nation's 2400 flight schools lost up to $15 million a day
while VFR flights were banned, (The Business Review,
200 1).
Preliminary investigations following the events of
September 11 showed that several of the hijackers had
received flight training in the U.S., which raised concerns
about security checks of individuals in flight training
programs. It was later known that a number of hijackers
were on the watch list of the Department of Justice,
however, they were able to travel undetected through the
nation's airways on commercialairliners and through airport
security kilities.
On November 19, 200 1, the President signed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, creating the
Transportation Security Administration(TSA) as an agency
of the Department of Transportation. Under the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, flight schools and training
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centers received requirements 6om the FAA to advise the
Attorney General of any foreign applicants for flight
instruction and to provide specific information on them. The
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
developed the process and the details on the information to
be provided. Flight schools, training centers, and flight
instructors were advised of these procedures (AOPA-online,
December 26,200 1).
On January 5, 2002, a 15-year old student pilot
took an aircraft without authorization from the flight school
where he had been receiving flying lessons. The student
pilot took off without clearance, b-aversed military airspace
without permission, and crashed into a 42-story building in
downtown Tampa, Florida. There 'was damage to the
building, but no one inside the building or on the ground
was injured by the crash itself or by falling debris. There
was no fue, and the student was the only fatality. In view of
that incident, the FAA, on January 9,2002, suggested some
measures for enhanced security for flight schools and fixed
base operators (CNN-online, January 10, 2002). The
suggestions dealt primarily with limiting access to aircraft,
and keeping it from unauthorized use when it is unattended.
Another important issue as related to flying a light
aircraft was the use of a drone aircraft as a biological or
chemical weapon. These are pilotless and very small planes
that come in a variety of sizes, shapes and capabilities. They
can be equipped with sprayingand aerosol-type capabilities.
With today's Global Position Systems, GPS, and availability
of maps, these planes can be purchased, used, guided and
directed with great precision and capable of dispensing
chemical and biological weapons. The concerns about
drone aircraft were raised in February, 2003 before the war
in Iraq. Arguments were also made that these small planes
can be brought to the U.S. in small pieces and then be
assembled and used against specific targets in the U.S.
(CNN-online, February 25,2003).
It should be noted that security of general aviation
is of a national interest. In 2003, the TSA chartered a
working group on general aviation within the existing
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, (GAO, September
9, 2003). The working group consists of industry
stakeholders and is designed to identi@ and recommend
actions to close potential security gaps in general aviation.
On October 1,2003, the working group issued a report that
included a number of recommendations for general aviation
airport operators' voluntary use in evaluating airports'
security requirements. These recommendations were both
broad in scope and generic in their application, with the
intent that every general aviation airport and landing facility
Page 32
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operators may use them to evaluate that facility's physical
security, procedures, infrastructure, and resources. TSA is
taking some additional action to strengthen security at
general aviation airports, including developing a risk-based
self-assessment tool for general aviation to use in
identieing security concerns (GAO, November 5,2003).
By early 2005, TSA will issue "best practice"
guidelines for security at more than 18,000 landing facilities
nationwide that serve general aviation. TSA has also
implemented the "twelve-five rule", which requires that
operators using aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or more cany out a security
program (DOT-gov). Additionally, the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association (AOPA) has partnered with TSA to
develop a nationwide Airport Watch Program that uses the
more than 650,000 pilots as eyes and ears for observing and
reporting suspicious activity. This helps general aviation
keep airports securewithout needless and expensive security
requirements. AOPA Airport Watch is supported by a
centralized government provided toll 6ee hotline, and
system for reporting and acting on information provided by
general aviation pilots. The Airport Watch Program includes
warning signs for airports, informational literature, and
training videotape to educate pilots and airport employeesas
to how security of their airports and aircraft can be
enhanced, (AOPA - online).
In early October 2004, the House Transportation
and Infrastructure Committee approved a bill to enhance
commercial aviation security. This bill, along with other
security measures, is likely to be considered by the full
House as part of legislation developed in response to the
recommendations of the 9 11 Commission Report. Top
officials in AOPA were able to convince legislators to
exclude general aviation security from including in the bill.
They explained the substantial improvements in general
aviation security since September 11, 200 1. They also
reviewed federal regulations to show that the safeguards in
place governing flight over populated areas and near
structures. General aviation pilots flying under Part 9 1rules
know who their passengers are and what's in their luggage
- just like drivers of private passenger cars. Using a
vehicle comparison chart, AOPA officials demonstrated the
limited cargo capacity of a typical GA aircraft compared to
the potential explosive loads of the cargo vans or semi
trailer trucks that are ubiquitous in, for example, New York
City, (AOPA on-line).
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of
the tragic events of September 11 on the business of flight
training. The study was conducted by designing a
questionnaire and interviewing managers and directors of
JAAER, Spring 2005
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flight training schools at general aviation airports in Metro
Atlanta, Georgia. The information was tabulated and
analyzed statistically. The findings and limitations of the
study are discussed in the paper.
APPROACH
Our approach to assess the impacts of September
1 used interviews. We chose to design a questionnaire and
interview managers and directors of a few flight schools in
Metropolitan Atlanta. A copy of the questionnaire is at the
end of the paper. The questionnaire consists mainly of four
parts. Part I gathers information about individual flight
school which includes certification types; cpmposition of
fleet; customer breakdown in terms of those seeking careers
in aviation, business flying, or leisure flying; and association
of flight instructors with the school - that is part-time or
full-time employees. Part I1 of the questionnaire collects
information which describes the flight school operations
prior to the events of September 11. This information
includes the flight school perception of business growth, and
security precautions and procedures that were in place
before September 1 1, 200 1. Part 111 gathers information
about the changes that have taken place in terms of security
measures since September 11. This information includes
adoption of any new procedures as related to security checks
of trainees, availability of guiding procedures from the FAA
to flight schools, security training needs of flight training
schools, best methods to train flight schools on implanting
security measures, financial arrangements to implement
security procedures, and the impact of the events of
September 11 on the financial health of flight training. In
Part IV, managers of flight training schools express their

views on the outlook of the flight training business and
identify some measures that ought to be implemented to
revive their businesses.
Security of general aviation is a national issue
which is being addressed by the industry stakeholders.
However, for the purpose of demonstration and
manipulation of the data, we limited our analysis to thirteen
(13) flight training schools in Metropolitan Atlanta. These
schools were interviewed in the fall quarter of 2002 and are
located at Dekalb-Peachtree Airport, Cobb County AirportMcCollum Field, Fulton County Airport-Brown Field,
Peachtree City Airport-Falcon Field, Douglas Municipal
Airport, Griffin-Spalding County Airport, Clayton County
Airport - Tara Field, Gwinnett County Airport-Briscoe
Field. Individual school names are not identified, in the
paper to maintain their privacy. By limiting the scope of the
study to these thirteen flight schools, we hoped to capture a
group of homogenous flight schools in terms of operating
environment, and the socio-economic characteristics of the
users. A cursory examination of the responses showed that
the responses from one of the thirteen training schools were
completely inconsistent. The school was viewed as an
outlier observation, and was dropped from the list of flight
schools in the study.
Flight schoolsunder consideration were established
between 1984 and 1998, with an average of a little over ten
years in business. Seven schools have Part 61 Certification
only, and four schools have Part 61 and Part 141
Certification. Table 1 depicts the breakdown of
certifications and ratings offered by the schools.

Table 1: A breakdown of Flight Schools by Certifications
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All flight schools have single-engines; the number
varies h r n one to five planes with an average of about 2.5
planes. As one would expect, the seven flight schools that
offer multi-engine training would have multi-engine planes.
Each of the seven schools has one multi-engine plane.
The number of trainees in 2001 varies fkom 25 to 250.
The correlation between the number of trainees in each
school and the number of available planes is about 0.45.
The weak correlation suggests that trainees select flight
schools not only because of availably of planes but also
because of other factors such as reputation of the school, its
proximity to hornelwork, training fees, etc. It also suggests
that utilization of planes varies ~~onsiderably
among flight

schools. Figure 1 depicts a breakdown of the percentage 01
trainees in each school by purpose of training. Series 1 , 2
and 3 represent the percentages of trainees seeking careers
in aviation, business flying, and leisure flying; respectively.
The Figure shows a wide variation in trainee mix among the
different flight schools. On the average, half of the trainees
are interested in leisure travel. Those interested in pursuing
careers in aviation and those interested in business flying
are, on the average, equal. Finally, five schools in the
sample schools have fill-time flight instructors, four rely on
part-time instructors, and three have a combination of fulltime and part-time instructors.

Figure 1: Distribution of Students Seeking Flight Training

L

Career Oriented
Business
Leisure

Percentage
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DATA ANALYSIS

The Business Impact of September 11:

A Growing Consensus about Security:

The findings from the survey show that security measures
were virtually non-existent prior to September 11. No
background checks were conducted on applicants or
employees. The respondents did not feel that checks were
required by the FAA. Nor did they feel it was required to
have procedures in place to conduct such checks. They
indicated that they had never been contacted by the FAA (or
any other agencies) about these matters. The respondents
also indicated that there had been no security checking
procedures for aircraft renters. The findings show a sea
change, post September 11. Most of the respondents
reported that background checks are now in place for
American students, international students, and renters.

Flight schools do not exist to provide security. Their
main business is train student to fly. The events of
September 1 1 could certainly be seen as having an impact
on both their ability to do this job efficiently and on the
demand for flight training. By all outward appearances,
flight training would appear to be a bushes that is under a
great deal of strain. Much is written about the financial
status of major airline carriers, but little is said about the
prospects for flight training. Our survey explored this issue
through four questions, asking respondents to rate the
outlook for the flight trainingbusiness in general, before and
after September I I, and for the respondents own flight
school, before and after September 11.

Table 2: Respondent's Views of Flight Training Business Before
and After September 11
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As shown in Table 2, the views about the flight training
business are mixed, though they are certainly not overly
negative. Nor is there clear evidence that the outlook for the
flight school business changed dramatically as a result of
September 11. Looking at the extreme upper left cell, we
see that one flight school respondent saw significantgrowth,
both before and after September 11. Also, in the upper left
are respondents fiom 6 other schools who see moderate
growth. Two of these respondents predicted significant
growth prior to September 11 and shifted downward to
moderate growth for their post September I 1 rating. The 4
respondents predicting moderate growth gave the same
ratings for before and after September 11.
Among those respondentsholding more negative views,
the Table also shows three respondents who predicted
moderate growth prior to September 11 that shifted to a
rating of slow growth, one who predicted slow growth
before and after, and one who predicted stagnant growth
prior to September 1 1 and slow growth afterwards.

Coping with Insurance cost:
Spiraling insurance costs are one of the greatest threats
to the flight school business. The news here is mixed, but
generally positive. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents
indicatedthat their insurance premiums had stayed the same,
post 9-1 1. The increases (at those schools that had them)
ranged from 18 to 100 percent. The average increase was
49 percent. Only one respondent reported an increase of
100 percent, but this is certainly a stunning increase.
Seventy-five percent of the respondents indicated that they
were aware of flight schools that went banlaupt due to
"unanticipated increases in insurance premiums."
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Security Burdens and Flight Schools, Post September 11:
From the findings present above, we see that security
checks are now a fact of life for flight schools--at least most
of them. This raises many questions about the
implementation of the new security procedures. Flight
schools are now in the security business, to some extent or
another, in the post September 11 world.
One key question involves the role of the FAA in
security checks. Analysis of the surveys showed no
evidence that the FAA or the Department of Justice (DOJ)
is involved in security checking. The respondents did not
have any information on conducting security checks fiom
federal agencies, and no training had been provided. In
contrast, 67 percent of our respondents indicated that these
agencies should conduct the checks themselves.
Of course, there is no reason to think that federal
agencies will do checks for flight schools anytime soon.
This is most likely to be mandated and possibly there will
also be some sort oftraining to help ensure the effectiveness
of the process. Our respondents were asked about a number
of possible training methods, and the findings are presented
in Figure 2. A clear preference is evident, for live seminars
or videos over computer-based training or manuals.
If training on security checking was to be conducted,
our respondents were not very interested in assuming the
cost. All of our respondents indicated that individual flight
schools should not be required to pay for training, and 75
percent felt that the FAA should cover the cost. Indeed, our
respondents did not feel that they should pay the costs of
any aspects of background checking. Ninety-two percent
indicated that the FAA should pay the costs for security
checking and all of the respondents agreed that the flight
school industry should not be responsible for these costs.
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Figure 2: Respondent Preferences for FAA
Security Training

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
OF STUDY:

The tragic events of September 11,2001 have changed
the approachto aviation security planning, management and
policy. This paper attempted to investigate the effects of
September 11 on the flight training business. Data were
obtained 6om surveying 12 flight training schools in Metro
Atlanta. Major findings in our study include: a) security
measures were virtually non-existent prior to September 1 1;
b) background checks is now required on applicantsseeking
flight training; c) there is not strong statistical evidence that
the outlook for the flight training business changed
dramatically as a result of September 11 events; d) a
significant number of respondents indicated that they were
aware of flight school that went banlaupt due to
unanticipated increases in insurance premiums; and e) as
one would expect, flight schools are not interested in
assuming the cost of conducting security training or
JAAER, Spring 2005
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checking.
There are some limitatibns to our study. Although
security of general aviation is a national issue, the study was
conducted using a limited number of flight schools in
Metropolitan Atlanta. Thirteen flight schools were
interviewed and one had inconsistent results and was
dropped fiom the analysis. There were variations among
flight schools in terms of certification, number and types of
planes, mix of hainees by purpose, etc. Flight schools were,
however, selected ftom airports in Metro Atlanta. One may
suggest that the results of the study are thus confined to that
geographical area. It can also be suggested that future
studies would consider a much broader cross-sectional data
6om flight schools located in different parts of the U.S.;
thus capturing variations in the operating environments of
flight schools and in the socio-economic characteristics of
the users. .)
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Questionnaire

Assessing the Effects of the September 11 Events
on General Aviation Airports

GENERAL

1. Ownership of the airport:

State

County

City

Private

2. What are the sources of income for your airport?
% (roughly)

% (roughly)
% (roughly)

% (roughly)
% (roughly)
% (roughly)
% (roughly)
% (roughly)

3. What is the breakdown in aircraft operations in percentages (roughly):
Local Operations:

%

Itinerant Operations:

%

Others:

YO
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4. Does the airport have a control tower?
Yes
No

If YES, what are the hours of operations?

How many runways and their lengths that your airport has?
Is'
runway

Length:

2nd runway Length:
3rd runway Length:

6. Who are the tenants at your airport?
Flight Schools

Charter Operators
Avionics
Maintenance

7. Who are the users at your airport?

Flight Schools
Corporate Operators
Private1Leisure (Individuals)
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Commercial Operators (Charters)
Industrial Use (Leasing space in the airport vicinity)

II. PRESe~tember11.2001

How did you view the outlook of the General Aviation Industry prior to 9-1 1?
Growing significantly
Moderate growth
Slow growth
Stagnate
Declining
How did you view the outlook of YOUR Airwrt prior to 9-1 l ?
Growing significantly
Moderate growth
Slow growth
Stagnate
Declining
Did the FAA or any other agencies ever inquire whether YOUR Aimort had a procedure in place to conduct a
background check?
Yes

No

Was background checking on the employees of airports required by the FAA or any other agencies?
Yes

No

Were there any procedures set forth by the FAA or any other agencies for security and background checking on
airport employees or airport users?
Yes
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Was identification required by each of the following group while on the airport premises?
Airport Employees

Yes

Tenants of the Airport

No
Yes

Users of the Airport

Yes

No

No

7.
Was there any communication between the airport management and the tenants on security
issues?

Yes

No

1. Are there any information or ~ro~edures
currently available from the FAA or other agencies on guiding
General Aviation Airports to perform security checks?

Yes

No

2. Should security checks be conducted by individual General Aviation Airports or managed by the FAA-that
is the FAAlDOJ conduct security checks on airport employees and tenants?
Conducted by the FAAIDOJ
Conducted by individual Airports
3.

Is there any coordination between the management of your airport and the tenantslusers at your airport in
terms of "securityn?
Yes
No

4.

Do you see the need for the FAA to provide "securitv training" to Airports?
Yes
0 No

5. Do you see the need for certification of airports by the FAA based on "participation in a security training
programw-thatis an airport is certified if it participates in an approved security training program?
Yes
No

6. What would be the favorable method of providing security training to airport management
Seminars
Video tapes
Manuals
Computer Based Training (CBT)
7. In your opinion, who should pay for the expenses of t

m general aviation airports on security matters?

FAA
IndividualAirport
The tenants through increased fees
4. In your opinion, who should pay for the expenses of conductina "security checks"?
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FAA
Individual airport from operating income
The tenants through increased fees

5. Following the events of 9111, "insurance premiums" for YOUR airport:
Stayed the same
Increased by

% (roughly)

6. Are you aware of any tenants that went bankrupt due to "unanticipated increases in their insurance
premiums"?
Yes 0 No, If your answer is yes,how many tenants (roughly)?

-

IV. OUTLOOK FOR GENERAL AVIATION
1. How do you view the outlook of businesses at general aviation airports after 9-11 ?
Growing significantly
Moderate growth
Slow growth
Stagnate
Declining

2. How do you view the outlook of YOUR airport after 9-11 ?
Growing significantly
Moderate growth
Slow growth
Stagnate
Declining
3. What changes do you think ought to be made in order to revive the general aviation industry?
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